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1 Introduction 
An impressive trend in global financial markets is the growth of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs), 
some of which purport to invest ethically by considering the social and environmental impact 
of their financing. Yet, like private investors, these funds primarily view themselves as financial 
institutions interested in enhancing investment returns. A significant tension, therefore, may 
emerge between the ethical and financial expectations of SWFs. This article investigates two 
contrasting cases, the Norwegian Government Pension Fund - Global (NGPF-G) and the New 
Zealand Superannuation Fund (NZSF), in order to evaluate how they address any tensions 
between being both virtuous and prosperous. These SWFs have legislative mandates to invest 
ethically, and have been hailed by some researchers as having among the most progressive 
approaches in this area.1 But neither fund yet manages its entire portfolio comprehensively to 
promote sustainable development. 
Increasingly, nation-states are establishing SWFs in a trend that seemingly defies an era in 
which many governments have sought to deregulate or otherwise limit their hand in the 
market.2 In their governance, formally SWFs are public institutions but functionally they are 
generally expected to be private actors. They invest large pools of state-owned assets in the 
market to meet macro-economic policy objectives,3 such as to buffer the sponsoring state’s 
budget and economy against swings in international markets, or to build savings to meet future 
financial burdens such as pension payments. SWFs are typically funded through either 
commodity-based earnings, such as from a country’s natural resources sector, or by non-
commodity-based resources, such as foreign exchange reserves and general taxation revenue.4 
The NGPF-G is a commodity-based fund, built on Norway’s large oil reserves, while the NZSF is 
supported by non-commodity financing.  
Such concentration of wealth has made SWFs, an institutional phenomenon that began in the 
mid-1950s, influential actors in the global economy.5 According to the Sovereign Wealth Fund 
	  
1 United Nations Environment Program – Finance Initiative (UNEP-FI) Asset Management Working Group and 
UK Social Investment Forum (UKSIF), Responsible Investment in Focus: How Leading Public Pension Funds are Meeting 
the Challenge (UNEP-FI, 2007), 7. 
2 Ashby H.B. Monk, Sovereignty in the Era of Global Capitalism: The Rise of Sovereign Wealth Funds and the Power of 
Finance (School of Geography, Oxford University, 2010); Roland Beck and Michael Fidora, “The Impact of 
Sovereign Wealth Funds on Global Financial Markets,” Intereconomics (2008) 43(6): 349. 
3 Adrian Blundell-Wignall, Yu-Wei Hu and Juan Yermo, “Sovereign Wealth and Pension Fund Issues,” OECD 
Working Papers on Insurance and Private Pensions (2008) 14: 4. 
4 Rumu Sarkar, “Sovereign Wealth Funds as a Development Tool for ASEAN Nations: From Social Wealth to 
Social Responsibility,” Georgetown Journal of International Law (2010) 41: 621, at 623. 
5 Ibid., 631.  
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Institute, as of May 2011 there were 52 SWFs worldwide, with assets of some US$4.3 trillion.6 
A recent survey by the Monitor Group, published in July 2011, put Norway’s SWF as the 
largest (with US$560 billion in assets), while New Zealand’s was ranked 20th (valued at 
US$15.8 billion).7 With SWFs’ assets expected to at least double within the next decade,8 and 
growing awareness of their economic clout and capacity to project state political power, 
international efforts to create voluntary behavioural codes for such funds have grown. The 
principal achievement to date is the Santiago Principles,9 which emphasise transparency, clarity, 
and equivalent treatment with private funds similarly operated. 
In addition to these issues, the socially conscious goals of some SWFs has stirred debate about 
the wisdom of mixing ethical investment with wealth maximisation goals, and attempting to 
influence corporate social and environmental behaviour.10 SWFs share several characteristics 
which might lead them more than private sector financiers to invest in sustainable 
development. Their ownership or control by a state can enmesh them in the machinery of 
government, and thereby render them instruments of public policy. Further, because of their 
sheer size and government backing, SWFs tend to have higher risk tolerances and might 
therefore bear investment strategies eschewed by private financiers. Thirdly, SWFs tend to have 
longer-term financial considerations than the private sector, which may encourage investing 
that is mindful of threats such as climate change. 
However, few states so far have obliged SWFs to invest ethically. While regulations to 
encourage socially responsible investment (“SRI,” as ethical investment is sometimes known) in 
the private sector are appearing, such as taxation incentives and corporate governance reforms, 
explicit duties to practice SRI have only been imposed on public financial institutions.11 The 
first precedents were adopted in the 1980s by some states and municipalities in the United 
States, which restricted government pension funds from investing in firms operating in the 
	  
6 Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, http://www.swfinstitute.org. 
7 Monitor Group, “SWF Assets Under Management” (7 July 2011), http://www.monitor.com/tabid/202/L/en-
US/Default.aspx. In local currency, the NZSF valued its assets as NZS18.8 billion in March 2011 (see 
http://www.nzsuperfund.co.nz/index.asp?PageID=2145855927), while the NGPF-G valued its at NOK 3,007 
trillion (Norges Bank Investment Management (NBIM), Annual Report 2010 (NBIM, 2010), 1). 
8 International Monetary Fund, “Norway’s Oil Fund Shows the Way for Wealth Funds,” IMF Survey Magazine: 
Policy (9 July 2008). 
9 International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds, Sovereign Wealth Funds, Generally Accepted Principles 
and Practices: Santiago Principles (October 2008), available at http://www.iwg-swf.org/pubs/gapplist.htm. 
10 Gordon L. Clark and Ashby Monk, “The Norwegian Government Pension Fund: Ethics Over Efficiency,” 
Rotman International Journal of Pension Management (2010) 3(1): 14, 17; Larry C. Backer, “Sovereign Wealth Funds 
as Regulatory Chameleons: The Norwegian Sovereign Wealth Funds and Public Global Governance Through 
Private Global Investment,” Georgetown Journal of International Law (2010) 41(2): 425. 
11 Benjamin J. Richardson, Socially Responsible Investment Law: Regulating the Unseen Polluters (Oxford University 
Press, 2008), 303-75. 
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discriminatory milieu of South Africa12 or Northern Ireland.13 Since 2000, the SWFs of 
Sweden, Norway, New Zealand and France have been subject to legislative direction to invest 
ethically, with more comprehensive and ambitious obligations than the American precedents. 
Ethical investment by SWFs is controversial. Some observers believe that investment should be 
based only on economic and financial grounds and, especially in the case of SWFs, there is 
further concern that SRI could be a means for sponsoring states to insinuate their social and 
environmental policies globally.14 For instance, a 2009 survey of 146 asset managers having 
routine dealings with SWFs reported that most “did not think governments should have any 
influence over investment decisions despite the fact that SWFs are managing governments’ 
money.”15 But such concerns misunderstand the changing rationale and aims of SRI.  
A long-standing movement that once had few adherents,16 SRI is attracting investors who are 
reassessing the financial relevance of social and environmental behaviour. No longer is SRI 
pursued largely as a matter of ethical compulsion, as in the 1970s divestment campaign led by 
religious groups against South Africa’s apartheid regime,17 and their earlier admonitions against 
investment in tobacco, alcohol and other “sin” stocks.18 Rather, many social investors today, in 
both the institutional and retail sectors, take a more comprehensive view of business conduct 
through the lens of sustainable development.  
Sustainable development (or “sustainability” as the concept is sometimes known) is an ideal 
widely endorsed in theory as a goal of states, international bodies and businesses, and has been 
enshrined as an objective of the European Union treaty.19 It seeks to curb unfettered economic 
	  
12 Patricia McCarroll, “Socially Responsible Investment of Public Pension Funds: The South Africa Issue and State 
Law,” Review of Law and Social Change (1980-81) 10: 407; Grace Jubinsky, “State and Municipal Governments 
React Against South African Apartheid,” University of Cincinnati Law Review (1985) 54: 453. 
13 See Christopher McCrudden, “Human Rights Codes for Transnational Corporations: What Can the Sullivan 
and MacBride Principles Tell Us?” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (1999) 19(2): 167; Neil J. Conway, “Investment 
Responsibility in Northern Ireland: The MacBride Principles of Fair Employment,” Loyola of Los Angeles 
International and Comparative Law Review (2002) 24: 1. 
14 Clark and Monks, supra note 10; Backer, supra note 10. 
15   Gordon L. Clark and Ashby Monk, “The Oxford Survey of Sovereign Wealth Funds' Asset Managers,” (School 
of Geography and the Environment, University of Oxford, 2009), 1. 
16 In Western Europe and North America, some surveys estimate that between 10 to 20% of all investment 
portfolios are now managed for ethical, social and environmental purposes, although these surveys use very broad 
definitions and certainly over-estimate the amount of effective SRI: European Social Investment Forum (Eurosif), 
European SRI Study (Eurosif, 2010); US Social Investment Forum (SIF), Socially Responsible Investing Trends in the United 
States (SIF, 2010). 
17 Christopher Coons, “Divestment Steamroller Seeks to Bury Apartheid,” Business and Society Review (1986) 57: 90. 
18 Russell Sparkes, Socially Responsible Investment: A Global Revolution (John Wiley & Sons, 2002), 71. 
19 Art. 11, Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, O.J. C 83/47 (30 
March 2010), (2008) O.J. C 115/47, states: “Environmental protection requirements must be integrated into the 
definition and implementation of the Union policies and activities, in particular with a view to promoting 
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exploitation of nature by ensuring consumption of renewable resources within their rate of 
regeneration, limiting waste and pollution to the assimilative capacity of the biosphere, and 
conserving the biodiversity of the planet.20 Some investors recognise the financial materiality of 
sustainability, such as when corporate polluters create financial risks or, conversely, firms 
pioneer innovative environmental technologies and services.21 Although, often the nexus 
between environmental and financial returns is misunderstood or overlooked by financiers. 
For large institutional investors, including SWFs, the sustainability imperative has mostly 
fluently been theorised through the concept of the “universal owner.” Hawley and Williams 
hypothesise that institutional investors who invest widely across the market will benefit 
financially by taking into account the social and environmental externalities in their 
portfolios.22 As economy-wide investors, they should “have no interest in abetting behavior by 
any one company that yields a short-term boost while threatening harm to the economic system 
as a whole.”23 Acting as a universal investor implies that any “externality” at the level of an 
individual company may result in a costly “internality” for an investor’s global portfolio.  
Such sentiments have underpinned the proliferation of codes of conduct for SRI,24 such as the 
United Nations Principles for Responsible Investment (UNPRI)25 and the Equator Principles.26 
Although adherence to such benchmarks is ostensibly voluntary, they have garnered many 
signatories, including the NGPF-G and the NZSF, and thereby helped standardise and 
	  
sustainable development.” On the lack of consistency between the European Treaty and the level of secondary law 
in company and business law, see Beate Sjåfjell, Towards a Sustainable European Company Law: A Normative Analysis 
of the Objectives of EU Law (Kluwer Law, 2009). 
20 Herman Daly, “Toward Some Operational Principles of Sustainable Development” Ecological Economics (1990) 1: 
1: Marie-Claire Segger and Ashfaq Khalfan, Sustainable Development Law: Principles, Practices, and Prospects (Oxford 
University Press, 2005). 
21 Matthew J. Kiernan, Investing in a Sustainable World: Why Green is the New Color of Money on Wall Street 
(AMACOM Books, 2009). Such sentiments are reflected in reports of the influential United Nations Environment 
Programme – Finance Initiative (UNEP-FI), such as: Show Me the Money: Linking Environmental, Social and 
Governance Issues to Company Value (UNEP-FI Asset Management Working Group, 2006). 
22 James Hawley and Andrew Williams, The Rise of Fiduciary Capitalism: How Institutional Investors Can Make 
Corporate America More Democratic (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000). 
23 Stephen Davis, Jon Lukomnik and David Pitt-Watson, The New Capitalists. How Citizen Investors are Reshaping the 
Corporate Agenda (Harvard Business Press, 2006), 18. 
24 See Kate Miles, “Targeting Financiers: Can Voluntary Codes of Conduct for the Investment and Financing 
Sectors Achieve Environmental and Sustainability Objectives?” in Critical Issues in Environmental Taxation, volume 5, 
eds Nathalie Chalifour, et al. (Oxford University Press, 2008), 947; Deborah Leipziger, The Corporate Responsibility 
Code Book (Greenleaf Publishing, 2003). 
25 http://www.unpri.org. 
26 http://www.equator-principles.com. 
	  	   	   5	  
Nordic Journal of Commercial Law 
issue 2011#2 
disseminate SRI norms and practices.27 Some interesting research has begun to measure the 
cost of environmental externalities to universal investors. A report prepared for the UNPRI 
Secretariat evaluated the price of environmental damage worldwide to which the companies in 
a representative investment portfolio contribute, and estimated these in 2008 to be US$6.6 
trillion or 11% of global GDP.28 The report expects such costs by 2050 to grow to US$28.6 
trillion (18% of projected global GDP).29 
The rest of this article takes up these themes by examining the SRI policies and practices of the 
Norwegian and New Zealand SWFs. In comparing how they attempt to reconcile their ethical 
and financial aspirations, the article highlights the importance of governance frameworks. 
While there are some salient differences in how each SWF is governed, each has, especially in 
their early years, focused on avoiding complicity in unethical conduct or social and 
environmental harm. This stance represented a rather narrow approach to ethical investment, 
which limited the capacity of these SWFs to promote environmentally sustainable development. 
More recently, both funds have begun to accept the business case for SRI, and reconceptualised 
ethical investment as a means of promoting long-term financial returns. But neither the NGPF-
G nor the NZSF is mandated to actively promote sustainable development or to seek 
improvements in corporations’ sustainability performance. In the future evolution of SWFs, the 
creation of explicit duties to invest in sustainability is perhaps the next logical step if they are to 
influence benignly the global economy. 
2 Norwegian Government Pension Fund - Global (NGPF-G) 
2.1 Institutional and legal structure 
The NGPF-G (Statens pensjonsfond – Utland) is a sovereign fund that invests proceeds from 
Norway’s petroleum industry that has prospered since oil was discovered in the North Sea in 
1969. Originally known as the Petroleum Fund, it was established in 1990 through the Act of 
the Government Petroleum Fund (Lov om Statens petroleumsfond). The Fund  did not receive any 
capital until 1996, when a sufficient government budget surplus arose. The Fund’s statutory 
framework was overhauled in December 2005,30 which resulted in it being renamed the 
“Government Pension Fund – Global,” to reflect that it is intended to meet future pension 
costs (although it does not yet directly have any such liabilities). The accompanying regulations 
	  
27 Benjamin J. Richardson, “Financing Sustainability: The New Transnational Governance of Socially Responsible 
Investment,” Yearbook of International Environmental Law (Oxford University Press) (2007) 17: 73. 
28 Principles of Responsible Investment (PRI) Association and UNEP-FI, Universal Ownership: Why Externalities 
Matter to Institutional Investors (PRI Association and UNEP-FI, 2010), 2. 
29 The majority of these costs are attributed to greenhouse gas emissions and unsustainable use of water. 
30 Act of the Government Pension Fund (Lov om Statens pensjonsfond), no. 123 (2005). 
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for governance of the NGPF-G have periodically been revised, most recently in March 2010.31 
While the government mandates the NGPF-G to operate like a private investor, it is expected to 
fulfill two broad policy goals of the state.  Firstly, as a vehicle for long-term savings, the Fund 
should ensure that a reasonable share of Norway’s petroleum wealth benefits future generations 
of Norwegians. Secondly, it should avoid investments that would make it complicit in unethical 
or harmful social and environmental practices. Investing only in foreign assets so as to avoid 
overheating the domestic economy, the NGPF-G has grown immensely to reach almost NOK 
3,100 billion at the beginning of 2011.32 Its sister fund, the Government Pension Fund 
Norway, invests just in Norway and other Scandinavian countries. 
In contrast to some SWFs including New Zealand’s, the NGPF-G is closely tied to the 
government. Its administration is divided among three governmental entities. The Norwegian 
Ministry of Finance retains ultimate responsibility for the policy and management of the NGPF-
G, including ethical investment decisions such as to exclude a company. The Norges Bank 
(Norway’s central bank) has operational control, and through its ownership rights in companies 
it handles corporate engagement. The Bank has devolved many of its responsibilities to Norges 
Bank Investment Management (NBIM)33 and external fund managers. Thirdly, a government-
appointed Council on Ethics advises on ethical investment decisions relating primarily to the 
exclusion of companies. The activities of all three entities are overseen by the Norwegian 
Parliament (Storting), which approves the NGPF-G’s investment strategy, and scrutinises 
annual reports of the Ministry of Finance and its ethical investment guidelines. 
While the NGPF-G functions under a legal framework that reflects a “public commitment to 
procedural democracy,”34 and which encourages practices that are broadly reflective of the 
values of Norwegian society, the general public itself has few opportunities to participate 
directly in the fund’s governance except circuitously through their elected Storting 
representatives. The NGPF-G decision-making, at least, is highly transparent. All 
recommendations of the Council are publicly disclosed, with detailed reasons.35 The Norges 
Bank consults with the public before submitting to the Ministry its plans for exercise of active 
	  
31 The regulations are consolidated as the Management Mandate for the Government Pension Fund, available at 
http://www.regjeringen.no/Upload/FIN/Statens%20pensjonsfond/mandat_spu_eng.pdf. 
32 Norwegian Ministry of Finance, The Management of the Government Pension Fund in 2010 (Report No. 15 (2010-
2011) to the Storting, 2011), 20. 
33 See http://www.nbim.no. 
34 Clark and Monk, supra note 10, at 15. 
35 The Council’s Guidelines oblige it to justify its recommendations, including “the Council’s assessment of the 
specific basis for exclusion and any comments on the case from the company”, and it shall, insofar as possible, rely 
on evidence that “can be verified”: Guidelines for Observation and Exclusion from the Government Pension Fund Global’s 
Investment Universe (2010), s. 5(4); available at: http://www.regjeringen.no/en/sub/styrer-rad-utvalg/ 
ethics_council/ethical-guidelines.html?id=425277. 
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ownership in the NGPF-G’s portfolio companies,36 and it must inform the public about its 
work in active ownership and integration of environmental and social issues.37 Another 
transparency mechanism is the annual reporting by the Ministry of Finance to the Storting on 
the operations and performance of the NGPF-G.38 While no citizen may judicially challenge a 
decision of the Council or the Ministry (exclusion of a company is not open to judicial appeal), 
procedures allow public input into their decisions. The Council meets annually with 
nongovernmental organisations to discuss its policies and practices; attendance is on an 
invitational basis, but is routinely granted to groups that have been in recent contact with the 
Council. Informal channels of complaint also exist, including that any individual or group may 
write to the Council or the Ministry to voice concerns.39 
2.2 The turn to ethical investment 
The NGPF-G lacked any SRI mandate until 2001. The Norwegian Government then 
established on a three-year trial a dedicated “Environment Fund” within the larger Petroleum 
Fund (as it was then known) for investing in companies in emerging economies that met 
environmental performance criteria.40 Concomitantly, because it is a SWF, with the potential 
for its decisions or omissions to be attributed to Norway as a matter of state responsibility 
under international law, the Fund as a whole would sometimes consider issues of human rights 
or environmental protection. Its first ethical screenings were guided by an Advisory 
Commission on International Law appointed by the Ministry of Finance in 2001.41 The 
Commission responded to enquiries from the Ministry regarding whether specific investments 
might conflict with Norway’s international legal obligations. For example, in April 2002 the 
Ministry directed the Fund to divest from Singapore Technologies Engineering because of its 
links to production of anti-personnel mines, contrary to Norway’s obligations under the Ottawa 
Convention on Anti-Personnel Mines.42 
	  
36 Guidelines for Norges Bank’s Work on Responsible Management and Active Ownership of the Government Pension Fund 
Global (2010), s. 2(3), available at: http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fin/Selected-topics/the-government-
pension-fund/responsible-investments/Guidelines-for-Norges-Banks-work-on-responsible-management-and-active-
ownership-of-the-Government-Pension-Fund-Global-GPFG.html?id=594253. 
37 Ibid., s. 4. 
38 See, e.g., Norwegian Ministry of Finance, The Management of the Government Pension Fund in 2009 (Report No. 10 
(2009-2010) to the Storting, 2010). 
39 One example is when the Rainforest Action Group lobbied the NGPF-G to exclude some extractive industries. 
40 In 2004, the Environment Fund was integrated into its parent Fund, whose entire investment portfolio became 
subject to an ethical mandate. 
41 The Advisory Commission was replaced by the Council on Ethics in 2004. 
42 The Petroleum Fund Advisory Commission on International Law, Memorandum to the Ministry of Finance: 
Question of Whether Investments in Singapore Technologies Engineering Can Imply a Violation of Norway’s International 
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In 2002 Norway moved to develop regulations to create a normatively and procedurally clearer 
approach to ethical investment by the Fund. It appointed a committee chaired by Professor 
Hans Peter Graver for this purpose.43 While the Graver Committee did not believe the Fund 
should have an overriding mission to leverage its resources to improve corporate social and 
environmental behaviour, it stressed “sustainable economic development is essential to a long-
term return on a broad-based financial portfolio.”44 Thus, the Committee concluded:  
 
The requirement for a long-term return gives rise to ethical obligations in relation to the 
requirement for sustainable development in a longer-term perspective. Sustainable 
development is a precondition for return on the Petroleum Fund’s financial 
investments in the long term.45  
In addition, the Graver Committee rationalised ethical investment on the ground that the 
Fund should avoid complicity in gross or systematic breaches of ethical norms relating to human 
rights and the environment: 
 
Even though the issue of complicity raises difficult questions, the Committee considers, 
in principle, that owning shares or bonds in a company that can be expected to commit 
gross unethical actions may be regarded as complicity in these actions. The reason for 
this is that such investments are directly intended to achieve returns from the company, 
that a permanent connection is thus established between the ... Fund and the company, 
and that the question of whether or not to invest in a company is a matter of free 
choice.46 
In identifying a broad, democratic basis to support SRI decisions, the Graver Committee 
sought to rely on international agreements on environmental protection and human rights that 
Norway supports, rather than defining a separate basis rooted in Norwegian culture or national 
	  
Obligations (22 March, 2002), citing the Ottawa Convention, which stipulates that States Parties should not “assist, 
encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this 
Convention.” The Ottawa Convention is officially known as the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, 
Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and Their Destruction, I.L.M. (1997) 36: 1507.  
43 Norwegian Ministry of Finance, The Report from the Graver Committee (2003), available at: 
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fin/tema/statens_pensjonsfond/ansvarlige-
investeringer/graverutvalget/Report-on-ethical-guidelines.html?id=420232.  
44 Ibid., s. 1. 
45 Ibid., s. 3.1. 
46 Ibid., s. 2.2. 
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policy.47 The Committee reasoned that while most international legal obligations apply only to 
states, companies may aggravate or facilitate human rights and environmental violations 
committed by states, and the NGPF-G might contribute to companies’ misdeeds through its 
stock ownership. 
While excluding companies from the NGPF-G might influence their behaviour, in addition to 
any influence achieved by corporate engagement, the Graver Committee focused on exclusion 
as a means of avoiding the Fund’s own complicity in ethically problematic activities. By contrast, 
the former Environment Fund was conceived as a mechanism to promote sustainable 
development and leverage environmental improvements in the targeted economies. 
In November 2004, regulations inspired by the Graver Committee were adopted and a Council 
on Ethics took charge to evaluate potential investments for compliance.48 The five members of 
the Council on Ethics, each appointed by the Ministry of Finance, blend practical and 
theoretical expertise. Presently, it comprises two academics, a former government diplomat, a 
professional scientist and an investment manager. The Council submits recommendations to 
the Ministry, which makes final decisions on exclusion of companies. The Council nearly 
always makes its recommendations on a consensual rather than majoritarian basis. It has wide 
discretion in passing judgement on serious human rights violations, gross corruption, severe 
environmental damage and general violations of fundamental ethical norms. In assessing 
investments on these grounds, it relies not only on international treaties ratified by Norway, but 
also soft law standards approved by Norway such as the UN Global Compact and the OECD 
Guidelines for Corporate Governance and for Multinational Enterprises.49 
2.3 NGPF-G’s revised ethical guidelines 
The NGPF-G’s current ethical guidelines were adopted in 2010 following a major review in 
2008 of the legal mandate and practices of the Council on Ethics conducted by the Ministry of 
Finance. The review included a separate commissioned report, written by the Albright Group 
and Professor Simon Chesterman.50 The results were mainly procedural rather than normative 
	  
47 Norwegian Ministry of Finance, The Report from the Graver Committee (11 July 2003), available at: 
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fin/Selected-topics/the-government-pension-fund/responsible-investments/ 
The-Graver-Committee---documents/The-Graver-Committee-and-Ethical-Guideli.html?id=434926. 
48 Regulations on the Management of the Government Pension Fund – Global (Forskrift om forvaltning av 
Statens pensjonsfond utland (2006), s 8(1). 
49 UN Global Compact: http://www.unglobalcompact.org. OECD Guidelines for Corporate Governance and for 
Multinational Enterprises: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/36/1922428.pdf. 
50 The Albright Group and Simon Chesterman, Assessment of Implementation of Articles 3 and 4 of the Ethical 
Guidelines for the Government Pension Fund – Global (Report submitted to the Norwegian Ministry of Finance, May 
2008). 
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changes. The review concluded that the ethical guidelines had proven to be generally robust, 
but recommended more engagement with companies, particularly with firms under scrutiny.51 
It also recommended that tobacco production be singled out as a new criterion for investment 
exclusion. The Albright and Chesterman report recommended greater collaboration between 
the Council and NBIM, more attention to climate change, more opportunities for public 
submissions and dialogue with companies, and improved disclosure of implementation of the 
ethical guidelines.52 
Consequently, in March 2010 the Ministry of Finance issued two standards that were accepted 
by the Storting: the Guidelines for Observation and Exclusion from the Government Pension Fund 
Global’s Investment Universe53 (hereafter Guidelines I), and the Guidelines for Norges Bank’s Work 
on Responsible Management and Active Ownership (hereafter Guidelines II).54 The Norwegian 
Ministry of Finance also initiated a complementary programme for active environmental-related 
investment, focusing on firms pioneering climate-friendly energy efficiency, carbon capture and 
storage, water technology, and waste and pollution management. The programme is worth 
about NOK 20 billion (equivalent to less than 1% of the value of the NGPF-G portfolio) 
invested between 2010 and 2015.55 Many of these targeted investments are in environmental 
bonds for financing eco-friendly projects, such as the World Bank’s Green Bonds.56 
The guidelines continue the exclusion mechanism for companies that engage in unethical 
activities, and strengthen the NGPF-G’s use of active shareholding and exertion of responsible 
influence in its portfolio companies with a view to promoting sustainable development. 
Guidelines I allow the Ministry, on the advice of the Council on Ethics, to exclude companies 
from the NGPF-G portfolio: 
 
if there is an unacceptable risk that the company contributes to or is responsible for: 
a) serious or systematic human rights violations, such as murder, torture,  deprivation of 
liberty, forced labour, the worst forms of child labour and other child exploitation; 
b) serious violations of the rights of individuals in situations of war or conflict; 
c) severe environmental damage; 
	  
51 Norwegian Ministry of Finance, On the Management of the Government Pension Fund (GPF) in 2008 (Report no. 20 
(2008-2009) to the Storting, 2009). 
52 The Albright Group and Chesterman, supra note 50, at 5-7. 
53 See supra note 35. 
54 See supra note 36. 
55 Norwegian Ministry of Finance, supra note 51, at 11. 
56 World Bank Green Bonds, http://treasury.worldbank.org/cmd/htm/WorldBankGreenBonds.html. 
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d) gross corruption; 
e) other particularly serious violations of fundamental ethical norms.57 
From the yardstick of sustainable development, however, the Guidelines’ threshold of “severe 
environmental damage” is too high. Much environmental degradation such as climate change is 
piece-meal and only significant cumulatively. Consequently, the NGPF-G must rely on other 
mechanisms if it wishes to address environmental issues more comprehensively. 
The Guidelines I elaborate factors that the Ministry may take into consideration, which include 
“the probability of future violations of ethical norms, the severity and extent of the norm 
violations, the connection between the norm violations and the company in which the Fund is 
invested, and whether the company does what may reasonably be expected to reduce the risk of 
future violations of norms within a reasonable time frame.”58 Positive actions taken by a 
company to safeguard the environment may also be taken into account,59 and companies 
excluded may be readmitted to the Fund if their behaviour improves. The Guidelines I also 
require, on the advice of the Council, exclusion of companies that produce tobacco, produce 
weapons that violate fundamental humanitarian principles, or sell weapons or military material 
to pariah states.60 Importantly, the Ministry may use other measures before excluding a 
company, such as active engagement or close observation of a firm.61 Companies proposed for 
exclusion must be warned and given reasons, with an opportunity to respond.62 The revised 
Guidelines also contain provisions to improve communications between the Council on Ethics 
and the Norges Bank to ensure any contact with companies is coordinated.63 
Guidelines II, which is directed to the work of the Norges Bank, reflects assumptions of the 
“universal investor” thesis, in which long-term financial returns hinge on maintenance of 
healthy social and environmental returns.64 Thus, while Guidelines II requires Norges Bank to 
manage the NGPF-G in order to achieve the “highest possible return,”65 this objective is 
qualified as “dependent on sustainable development in economic, environmental and social 
terms [and] well-functioning, legitimate and effective markets.”66 Relatedly, Guidelines II obliges 
	  
57 Guideline I, s. 2(3). 
58 Ibid., s. 2(4). 
59 Ibid., s. 2(5). 
60 Ibid., s. 2(1)-(2). 
61 Ibid., s. 3. 
62 Ibid., s. 5(3). 
63 Ibid., s. 6. 
64 The Norwegian Ministry of Finance has explicitly endorsed this thesis: supra note 38, at 133-36. 
65 Guideline II, s. 1(1). 
66 Ibid. 
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the Bank to integrate good corporate governance, environmental and social issues in its 
investments,67 and to contribute actively to good international standards in responsible 
management and active ownership.68 
As a result of the 2010 revisions to the NGPF-G’s governance, with more emphasis on the 
economic case for ethical investing, the criticisms of some commentators that “the process 
supporting the ethical mandate actually constrains the fund’s functional efficiency,” and that it 
“may pay a high price for its ethical policies over the long-term,”69 are perhaps less valid, if ever 
they were. The NGPF-G achieved average annual returns in the decade since January 2000 of 
3.02%, above the government’s expected benchmark investment performance of 2.40% per 
year.70 While many SRI practitioners believe that engagement is preferable to exclusion, as both 
a means of retaining a properly diversified portfolio and to retain influence within targeted 
companies as a shareholder or bondholder,71 the NGPF-G shows that these strategies are not 
mutually exclusive. Corporate engagement can occur in the lead-up to exclusion, and 
afterwards; for example, after Rio Tinto was excluded it sought re-admission and began 
dialogue with the NGPF-G about how it could redeem itself. 
2.4 Norwegian ethical investment in practice 
Traditionally, the primary strength of the NGPF-G’s approach to ethical investment has been 
its ability to scrutinise individual companies meticulously and to inflict tangible sanctions. But 
targeting individual entities is necessarily highly selective in a portfolio of over 8,000 
companies, and thus does not ensure a systematic, portfolio-wide approach. The NGPF-G has 
recently diversified its tools for promoting SRI, as a result of several initiatives including: 
changes to the Fund’s governing regulations, its new program for positive environmental 
investment, publication of its “expectations” documents on climate change and other concerns, 
and greater collaboration with other institutional investors. The NGPF-G therefore has, in 
theory, become better positioned to take a more comprehensive approach to sustainable 
development. 
	  
67 Ibid., s. 1(2). 
68 Ibid., s. 3. 
69 Clark and Monk, supra note 10, at 14 and 17. 
70 Norges Bank Investment Management, NBIM Performance Results (NBIM, 2010), 8, available at 
http://www.nbim.no/Global/Reports/2010/GIPS%20report/GIPS%20Report%20Final_update%2020100811.p
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71 Doug Watt, “Why SRI Funds Aren’t a Monolithic Group,” Morningstar (23 April 2009), available at 
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Funds). 
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In making recommendations to the Ministry, the Council on Ethics follows a sequence of 
procedures for gathering information, reviewing evidence and applying ethical guidelines. In 
considering specific cases, the Council may act on its own volition or at the request of the 
Ministry. The Council is not a legal tribunal and is not bound by rules of evidence or other 
judicial-like formalities, although its recommendations resemble rudimentary court judgements 
in their evaluation of evidence and justification of decisions.72 It uses a “quasi-legal” process, 
following its precedents and allowing companies to hear allegations and respond to them.73 But 
the Council is not obliged to prove occurrence of an environmental violation or other wrong to 
recommend exclusion of a company. Indeed, much of its work addresses the “unacceptable risk 
of breaches taking place in the future,” rather than ongoing or past breaches.74 
The Council’s advice is generally persuasive, as nearly always the Minister for Finance accepts 
its recommendation.75 So far, the Minister has rejected the Council’s advice only twice. One 
involved the German company Siemens, which is suspected of corruption, and remains on the 
Council’s watch list. The second case involved Monsanto, which through its subsidiaries 
allegedly exploits child labour in India’s cotton seed industry. The Ministry and the Norges 
Bank opposed singling our Monsanto for exclusion, favouring instead an engagement process 
that would involve many companies in this troubled economic sector.76 
With a support staff of eight and an annual budget of NOK 11 million (as at the end of 
2010),77 the Council is able to scrutinise closely just a small fraction of the NGPF-G’s 
investment portfolio. Such “resource constraint[s],” suggest some commentators, “forces it to 
make subjective decisions about ethical targets.”78 To overcome such hindrances, the Council 
increasingly relies on external consultants to monitor companies and provide it with monthly 
reports, which it uses for selecting firms for investigation.79 The NBIM also plays a key role in 
discharging the NGPF-G’s ethical investment policy, as it exercises the Fund’s ownership rights 
through sponsoring and supporting shareholder resolutions, proxy voting, and informal 
corporate engagement. In 2007, for example, the NBIM voted on more than 38,000 
	  
72 Simon Chesterman, “The Turn to Ethics: Divestment from Multinational Corporations for Human Rights 
Violations – The Case of Norway’s Sovereign Wealth Fund,” American University International Law Review (2008) 
23: 577 at 605. 
73 Ibid, 594. 
74 Recommendation from the Norwegian Ministry of Finance, The Petroleum Fund’s Council of Ethics on Total S.A. 
(14 Nov. 2005), s. 3.3 
75 Clark and Monk, supra note 10, at 16. 
76 John Acher, “Norway Fund Drops Rio Tinto on Ethical Grounds,” Reuters (9 September 2008), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/09/09/us-norway-fund-riotinto-idUSL872852220080909. 
77 Council of Ethics for the Government Pension Fund Global, Annual Report 2010 (2010), 8. 
78 Clark and Monk, supra note 10, at 17. 
79 Ibid., 7. 
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shareholder proposals in more than 4,200 companies.80 But, as with the Council, the NBIM 
has limited institutional capacity and has elected to engage mainly with the largest (but not 
necessarily the most problematic) companies.  
The NGPF-G investment regulations do not instruct how to resolve any trade-offs between 
ethical and financial considerations, although they postulate that a long-term synergy between 
financial returns and sustainable development exists.81 In practice, the NGPF-G is increasingly 
governed on the premise that it can be both virtuous and prosperous.82 The Norwegian 
Ministry of Finance affirmed in its 2010 annual report that “[s]olid financial returns over time 
depend on a sustainable development in economic, environmental and social terms,”83 and it 
regards the NGPF-G as a “universal owner” exposed to environmental and social externalities 
that should be addressed.84 Nonetheless, the Norwegian Ministry of Finance has acknowledged 
that: 
In some cases, the concerns of ensuring long-term financial returns and taking widely 
shared values into account will coincide, but not always. For example, the Fund will not 
invest in companies that are in gross breach of fundamental ethical norms, regardless of 
the effect this will have on returns.85 
The NGPF-G presently screens companies using the services of several consultancy firms. From 
this information, the Council on Ethics maintains a short-list of some 200 - 300 companies that 
warrant greater scrutiny. It pays close regard to international law in judging companies, 
although its ethical guidelines mandate it to go beyond international law. A company thus does 
not have to formally breach any international treaty to be recommended for exclusion; indeed, 
as companies are not true international legal personalities who can be prosecuted in an 
international court, instances of companies incurring international legal sanctions are very rare. 
Thus, the Council routinely looks for other evidence of ethical violations, including breaches of 
national law and disregard for soft law standards such as the UN Global Compact. 
	  
80 Anita M. Halvorssen, Addressing Climate Change Through the Norwegian Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF) - Using 
Responsible Investments to Encourage Corporations to Take ESG Issues into Account in their Decision-making (University of 
Oslo Faculty of Law Legal Studies, Research Paper Series, No. 2010-06), 29. See also Anita M. Halvorssen, “The 
Norwegian Sovereign Wealth Fund’s Ethical Guidelines: A Model for Investors,” European Company Law (2011) 
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81 Guidelines II, s. 1. 
82 Norwegian Ministry of Finance, supra note 38, at 11, 16; see also Secretary General Tore Eriksen, “The 
Norwegian Petroleum Sector and the Government Pension Fund – Global” (Ministry of Finance, June 2006), 23; 
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Sector_te.pdf. 
83 Norwegian Ministry of Finance, supra note 32, at 3. 
84 Ibid., 12. 
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Based on recommendations of the Council on Ethics, the NGPF-G has divested from 
companies producing cluster bombs (eg, Lockheed Martin) and nuclear weapons components 
(eg, Boeing), breaching human rights and labor standards (eg, Walmart), and causing severe 
environmental damage (Freeport-McMoRan Copper & Gold). One of its most publicised 
divestments was US$400 million of Wal-Mart shares in March 2006, which led to protests from 
the US Ambassador to Norway.86 As of May 2011, the NGPF-G had divested from or excluded 
51 companies, a tiny number compared to the some 8,300 companies currently in its 
portfolio.87 The Fund has also excluded one state, Myanmar (Burma), by refusing to buy its 
government bonds. Divestment has usually occurred after dialogue and engagement strategies 
have failed.88 The NGPF-G has also occasionally readmitted formerly excluded companies 
following new evidence presented by the Council of improved behaviour.89 
Whereas the mandate of the Council on Ethics is to recommend exclusion of companies, 
engagement rests with Norges Bank. Exclusion tends be applied against the worst offenders, 
while companies whose behaviour needs improvement and is considered redeemable may be 
engaged. The NGPF-G presently has an average ownership stake of about 1 per cent in its 8.300 
companies,90 and only engages with a miniscule fraction of its portfolio at any one time. 
Engagement may occur as a prelude to recommending exclusion. When the Council envisions 
recommending exclusion, it sends a draft recommendation to the company’s management for 
response.91 This process may trigger some dialogue with the firm, and persuade it to make 
changes (eg, selling-off part of the business or cancelling a project) in order to avoid exclusion.92 
In 2009, the Norges Bank picked six strategic priority areas for corporate engagement and other 
forms of active ownership, of which three are explicit sustainability issues: climate change, water 
management and children’s rights.93 Climate change, the gravest environmental threat, presents 
a moral dilemma for NGPF-G managers. Black-listing companies that contribute to global 
warming would put Norway in an awkward position as the NGPF-G has been financed from 
proceeds of the country’s fossil fuels. The Council on Ethics believes that since virtually 
	  
86 Mark Landler, “Norway Keeps Nest Egg From Some U.S. Companies,” New York Times (4 May 2007), available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/04/business/worldbusiness/04norway.html. 
87 Norwegian Ministry of Finance, “Companies Excluded from Investment Universe,” 
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88 Norges Bank Investment Management, Annual Report 2006 (Norges Bank, 2007), s. 4.2. 
89 Norwegian Ministry of Finance, supra note 38, at 75. 
90 Ibid., 65  
91 Gro Nystuen, “Etikk og kritikk,” Dagens Naeringsliv (11 September 2006), 4. 
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everyone is a contributor to climate change in a world that ubiquitously depends on fossil fuels, 
climate change itself is unsuitable as a rationale to exclude any specific entity. Therefore, 
instead of excluding oil and coal businesses as demanded by some environmental groups, the 
NBIM has released an “expectations” document on companies' management of risk factors 
relating to climate change.94 The expectations include having: 
strategies for managing both physical and economic climate effects, to measure its 
emissions and set targets for reducing them, to explore and exploit opportunities to 
develop new products and services that will help the transition to a low-carbon 
economy, and to develop a strategy for dealing with climate change risk in the supply 
chain.95  
Such measures, in turn, should enable the NGPF-G to manage its own climate change risks, 
which the Ministry of Finance recognises as “a long-term investor with a broad portfolio.”96 The 
Ministry has also collaborated in an international research project with other major 
institutional investors to foster a deeper understanding of the financial risks of climate 
change.97 Unusually, the Norges Bank has also written to some American companies to express 
its concerns how they campaigned against the imposition of carbon caps.98 Together, these 
strategies to address companies and issues on a portfolio-wide basis could provide important 
means for the NGPF-G to act as an ethical, universal owner.99 
3 New Zealand Superannuation Fund (NZSF) 
3.1 Legislative and institutional framework 
New Zealand (NZ), renowned for some of the most progressive environmental and social 
legislation in the world,100 has, like Norway, begun to consider whether and how to use public 
	  
94 Norges Bank Investment Management, NBIM Investor Expectations: Climate Change Management (Norges Bank, 
2008). See generally, Halvorssen, supra note 80. 
95 As summarised by the Norwegian Ministry of Finance, supra note 38, at 126. 
96 Ibid., 126. 
97 Norwegian Ministry of Finance, supra note 32, at 15. 
98 Norges Bank Investment Management, Government Pension Fund – Global Annual Report 2008 (Norges Bank, 
2009), 54. 
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Wealth and Universal Ownership,” Corporate Governance: An International Review (2007) 15(3): 427. 
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financial institutions to promote sustainable development and ethical policy. The New Zealand 
Superannuation Fund (NZSF) is the country’s first major step towards this goal.  
The NZSF was established in 2001 to ease the future financing burden of the country’s pension 
payments. NZ’s retirement income scheme is financed from general taxation revenue, where 
residents over the age of 65 receive a pension irrespective of their personal wealth. Because the 
country’s population is ageing, there is significant pressure on public revenue to sustain NZ 
superannuation.101 The Fund was created by the New Zealand Superannuation and Retirement 
Income Act of 2001 to invest NZ Government contributions to address this growth in demand 
for pensions. Since the Fund began operations in September 2003, it has grown rapidly to 
about NZ$19 billion of assets, as of early 2011,102 with investments principally in shares in 
global and NZ companies, real estate, commodities, and fixed interest. 
The legislative framework prescribes arrangements for the management and operation of the 
NZSF in order to limit political interference. The Fund is administered by a separate entity 
called the Guardians of New Zealand Superannuation,103 which enjoys a broad plenary power 
to invest subject only to specified statutory restrictions.104 While the NZSF holds assets 
belonging to the NZ Government, the legislation declares that the Guardians “are not a 
trustee.”105 The effect of this rider presumably is to avoid implying any common law fiduciary 
standards in the management of the Fund, and to limit its governance strictly to the terms of 
the enabling legislation. However, the Guardians are presumably still subject to judicial review, 
which would enable courts to issue remedies to ensure that the NZSF is administered in 
accordance with its legislative mandate and procedures. 
The Guardians’ Board consists of between five to seven members, appointed by the Cabinet on 
the recommendation of the Minister of Finance, after nominations from an independent 
nominating committee and consulting with representatives of other political parties.106 Only 
persons with “substantial experience, training, and expertise in the management of financial 
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investments” may be Board members.107 While the Guardians exercise overall control over the 
Fund, they have, like the NGPF-G, outsourced much work to external fund managers.108 
The Act includes a qualified obligation to invest ethically, which is considerably less prescriptive 
than Norway’s regulations. The Guardians’ primary duty is to: 
invest the Fund on a prudent, commercial basis … in a manner consistent with (a) best-
practice portfolio management; and (b) maximising return without undue risk to the 
Fund as a whole; and (c) avoiding prejudice to New Zealand's reputation as a 
responsible member of the world community.”109  
The legislation does not define this terminology, and offers no guidance on reconciling any 
conflicts between these goals. While the Guardians therefore have ample discretion to 
implement their mandate, they must prepare a statement of investment standards and 
procedures which, inter alia, “cover … ethical investment, including policies, standards, or 
procedures for avoiding prejudice to New Zealand’s reputation as a responsible member of the 
world community,”110 and the “retention, exercise, or delegation of voting rights acquired 
through investments.”111 The Fund must report annually to the NZ Government on its 
performance.112 
In governance arrangements, the NZ approach to ethical investment diverges from Norway’s in 
several interesting ways. Firstly, the ethical investment duty is comingled with other legislative 
goals relating to financial considerations. By contrast, Norway’s ethical screening Guidelines are 
placed in separate instrument to which compliance is not constrained by or conditional on the 
NGPF-G adhering to other legal norms. While Guidelines II relating to the Norges Bank’s 
active ownership obliges it to seek “the highest possible return,” this objective is stated to be 
“dependent on sustainable development in economic, environmental and social terms.”113 
Secondly, the NZSF lacks an ethics council to provide advice; decisions about ethical 
investment are ultimately the responsibility of the Guardians’ Board, a body without special 
expertise in such matters. Thirdly, while the NZSF must avoid prejudicing NZ’s reputation 
internationally, active consideration of social and environmental issues, and promotion of 
improved corporate behaviour, is not explicitly required. Indeed, the legislation has been 
	  
107 Section 55(1)(a). 
108 Controller and Auditor-General, Guardians of New Zealand Superannuation: Governance and Management of the 
New Zealand Superannuation Fund (New Zealand Government, May 2008), para. 5.8. 
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interpreted by NZ Treasury staff as simply requiring the NZSF “to have a policy regarding 
ethical investment: it does not prescribe any particular approach to or emphasis on ethical 
investment.”114 This laissez-faire approach contrasts with other NZ legislation relating to natural 
resources management and environmental protection115 that is much more prescriptive 
regarding sustainable development and related goals.  
3.2 Guardians’ ethical investment policies and practices 
The Guardians’ broad discretion to determine the NZSF’s ethical investment has enabled it to 
establish a range of processes and policies. A Responsible Investment Committee was 
appointed to draft ethical policies, monitor their implementation and generally to advise the 
Guardians’ Board on SRI matters. But it was disestablished in October 2009 when the Board 
assumed direct oversight of ethical policies as part of an avowed commitment to embed SRI 
considerations throughout its decision-making.116 Its Responsible Investment Policy is a relatively 
brief document that sketches the NZSF’s main ethical standards and methods.117 The 
Guardians rely on external agencies such as Innovest Strategic Value Advisors and Institutional 
Shareholder Services to monitor the majority of the NZSF’s portfolio for compliance with its 
ethical policy.  
As in the Norwegian approach, the Guardians rely on both exclusion and active ownership as 
means of ethical investment. Lately, they have also incorporated environmental and social risk 
analysis into their due diligence procedures and, like the NGPF-G, initiated positive investment 
measures to deliver “strong environmental or social returns in addition to sufficient investment 
returns.”118 In practice, however, there are some marked differences between these SWFs’ 
approaches.  
The Guardians were slow to fulfill their ethical mandate, being initially for two years without 
in-house SRI experts and lacking a formal policy. Their current policy of exclusion is mainly 
determined by a company’s economic sector rather than its individual practices. While the 
NGPF-G also excludes sectors, such as tobacco producers, its ethical mandate also requires 
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evaluation of firms’ specific conduct. The Guardians have adopted policies since 2006 to 
exclude entities involved in whaling, the manufacture of tobacco, cluster mines or anti-
personnel mines, and the production and testing of nuclear explosives.119 As of June 2009, it 
had ousted 12 companies that manufacture such mines or nuclear explosives, and excluded one 
whaling business and 20 tobacco companies.120 The Guardians rationalise any exclusion 
decisions on considerations of international law, and NZ law and government policy. For 
instance, the Guardians’ exclusion of producers of cluster mines was triggered by the NZ 
Government’s pending ratification of the Convention on Cluster Munitions.121 
Another ostensible difference between Norway and NZ is that the Guardians’ SRI strategy 
focuses “on acting as a responsible shareholder and fostering transparent corporate governance 
rather than necessarily excluding shares or securities.”122 In the 12 months until June 30, 2010, 
the Guardians had engaged on 345 occasions with companies concerning various social and 
environmental issues.123 Share exclusion is considered “a last resort for the Guardians,” only 
used if they “cannot bring about a positive outcome through exercising their shareholder 
rights.”124 However, in practice to date, the Guardians have used exclusion only for entities in a 
few designated economic sectors and not only as a “last resort.”  
Although environmental matters are encompassed in its Responsible Investment Policy, in April 
2009 the Guardians released a separate environmental policy statement and action plan that 
champions four issues: minimising waste, efficient use of energy, green procurement, and 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions.125 Much of this effort centres on reducing the 
environmental footprint of the NZSF’s in-house operations (eg, use of physical offices and staff 
travel), in addition to addressing any environmental impacts and risks from its portfolio 
companies.126 
As for the NGPF-G, the economic threat posed by climate change has galvanised some action in 
NZ. In the 12 months to June 30, 2010, the Guardians engaged on 250 occasions with 
companies on climate change issues, representing the substantial majority of its corporate 
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engagement activity.127 As a signatory to the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP), the NZSF is able 
to collaborate with institutional investors including the NGPF-G to advocate corporate 
disclosure of climate-related impacts and policies.128 In 2008 the Guardians wrote to every 
company in the NZX 50 Index (NZ’s premier stock market index) to encourage replies to CDP 
disclosure requests. According to the Guardians, the response-rate increased to 50% from 38% 
in the previous year, partly as a result of the Fund’s presence.129 Furthermore, the Guardians see 
their participation in the CDP as “important in raising awareness amongst NZ companies that 
investors globally are interested in the economic impacts of climate change and its potential 
effect on long-term shareholder value.”130 The NZSF is also a member of the Investor Group on 
Climate Change, a club of 20 Australian and NZ investors concerned about the potential 
financial impact of global warming.131 
While the NZSF has made great strides in its ethical investment policy and practices since 
2006, it still tends to trail its Norwegian counterpart and has been dogged by criticisms for 
alleged complicity in some unethical or unsustainable businesses. Some criticisms have been 
rationalised on the basis that the NZSF continues ties with companies blacklisted by Norway.132 
Some of the most vituperative objections have come from Investment Watch Aotearoa, a 
national network campaigning for ethical investment to be a duty of all NZ public funds.133 It 
once accused the NZSF of “invest[ing] large amounts of our taxpayer money in companies who 
… prop up murderous regimes and commit mass environmental destruction,”134 and more 
recently has excoriated the NZSF for allegedly investing in corporations “complicit in the 
Israeli occupation” of asserted Palestinian territories.135 In August 2011 the NZSF was accused 
of investing in a Chinese tobacco producer, contrary to the Fund’s policies.136 Also, the NZSF’s 
reluctance to use the divestment option more widely has troubled the Green Party,137 a growing 
political force in NZ politics. When the Green Party denigrated the NZSF for investing in 
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ExxonMobil, a company derided by many as a “climate change skeptic,”138 then NZSF Chief 
Executive, Paul Costello, retorted that there was no basis to exclude it because his Fund’s policy 
was to divest only from those companies whose products or activities are illegal in NZ.139 Robert 
Howell, head of the NZ Council for Socially Responsible Investment (NZCSRI), has also 
criticised the ambiguity of the world reputation clause in the governing legislation as failing to 
prevent the NZSF from investing in “companies with unacceptable or questionable human 
rights behaviour or environmental impacts, such as Nike, Walmart, BJ Services (operating in 
Myanmar), and Exxon Mobil.”140 
The NZ Government’s own Auditor-General has weighed into the debate, with its 2008 report 
concluding that “overall, the Guardians have taken an appropriate and pragmatic approach to 
responsible investment,” but “a number of challenges still face the Guardians in managing their 
responsible investment risk.”141 These include that, because “the Fund is not a substantial 
shareholder in any entity in its own right,” and the Guardians depend on collaboration from 
other investors whose decisions “are consistent with their ‘avoid prejudice’ requirement.”142 
The Auditor-General further cautioned that “[i]dentifying which companies to exclude can 
present challenges and requires a specialist screening agency (for example, checking for a 
company’s involvement in landmine manufacture),” and “it is not always possible for the Fund 
to identify all activities in pooled investment structures such as unit trusts.”143 The Auditor-
General also found that the Guardians’ investment screening process is limited to equity 
positions and sovereign securities held by the Fund, thus exposing it to ties to an excluded 
entity through other financial relationships such as by holding corporate bonds.144 
4 Becoming Marathon Investors for Sustainability 
Both the Norwegian and New Zealand SWFs resemble institutional chameleons in the 
conflicting expectations they face. They operate like private investment vehicles for maximising 
shareholder value, while encumbered with public responsibilities to fulfil the ethical policies of 
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their state. While ethical considerations of course are not necessarily only public in nature, and 
indeed a vibrant SRI market has evolved in recent years while states have increasingly opted for 
business-friendly policies,145 in the private realm ethical considerations have tended to be more 
vulnerable to usurpation by market pressures. Some commentators thus see tensions between 
SWFs’ financial and non-financial ambitions, and fear some SWFs might “serve as a covert 
mechanism for extending state power.”146  
Socially responsible investment does not necessarily entail any irresolvable trade-offs between 
public and private interests, or financial and ethical goals. While commercial considerations do 
not always coincide with ethical ones, over the very long-term they should given ecological 
constraints to infinite economic growth. In the near term, countervailing business motivations 
to fund unethical behaviour certainly can prevail because of underlying market and regulatory 
failures, or because investors perceive no financial value in ecological assets such as biodiversity 
that cannot be monetised.147 In the long-term, meaning at least several decades, the economic 
case for environmentally sustainable development solidifies. Take climate change, for example. 
The UK’s Stern Report of 2007 calculated that global warming if left unabated will by the 
middle of this century cut world GDP by between 5 to 10% annually, but only 1 to 2% of GDP 
if we act expeditiously.148 Other commentators such as Monbiot, Flannery, and Homer-Dixon 
predict even grimmer economic costs if business-as-usual continues.149 Financial markets can 
make investors myopic and inclined to ignore future costs, such as because institutional fund 
management is commonly devolved to specialists hired on short range contracts and financial 
accounting metrics heavily discount distant costs and benefits. 
To become marathon investors, the Norwegian and New Zealand SWFs must not only avoid 
companies that harm the environment or violate human rights, they should actively promote 
sustainable development. Traditionally, the notion of complicity has been a touchstone for their 
ethical investment policies. The Albright Group’s and Chesterman’s review of the NGPF-G 
observed that a “central tension within the Guidelines is the question of whether they are 
intended simply to avoid Norwegian complicity or influence the behaviour of others. The 
	  
145 See, e.g., Ronen Shamir, “Corporate Social Responsibility: Towards a New Market-Embedded Morality?” 
Theoretical Inquiries in Law (2008) 9(2): 371; Robert Hahn and Robert Stavins, “Economic Incentives for 
Environmental Protection: Integrating Theory and Practice,” American Economic Review (1992) 82: 464. 
146 Backer, supra note 10, at 176. 
147 Benjamin J. Richardson, “Keeping Ethical Investment Ethical: Regulatory Issues for Investing for 
Sustainability,” Journal of Business Ethics (2009) 87(4): 555, 556-57. 
148 Nicholas Stern, Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change (H.M. Treasury, 2007). 
149 George Monbiot, Heat: How to Stop the Planet Burning (HarperCollins, 2005); Timothy Flannery, The Weather 
Makers (Atlantic Monthly Press, 2006); Thomas Homer-Dixon, The Upside of Down: Catastrophe and Renewal and the 
Renewal of Civilisation (Alfred A. Knopf, 2006). 
	  	   	   24	  
Nordic Journal of Commercial Law 
issue 2011#2 
former is closer to the truth.150 Some of the Council on Ethics’ recommendations view 
divestment as necessary in order avoid the complicity of the Fund (and thus Norway) from 
human rights violations or environmental damage committed by companies in which the Fund 
invests.151 Somewhat similarly, the NZSF’s legislation, which obliges it to avoid “prejudice to 
New Zealand's reputation,”152 implies avoiding the stigma of profiting from unethical 
companies.153 And commentators and activists who have scrutinised the NZSF’s investments 
often couch their concerns in this language.154 Neither SWF, however, relies on a strict legal 
conception of complicity,155 but rather views complicity in an ethical and pragmatic sense.  
 Complicity is not a sufficient yardstick for promoting sustainability. Firstly, in the context of 
resource constraints that limit comprehensive screening, an ad hoc rather than a portfolio-wide 
approach consistent with universal ownership may disappointedly ensue. Secondly, it places the 
threshold for divestment too high, such as gross violation of human rights or severe 
environmental damage; however, much social injustice and ecological damage stems from 
incremental actions or omissions that viewed in isolation might seem trivial. Thirdly, complicity 
as an ethical and legal concept is conceptually confusing and imprecise regarding the degree of 
necessary knowledge or assistance required to trigger consequences.156  
While a commitment to sustainability sanctions divestment from the worst businesses, it 
requires other strategies. These include positive investment in companies that are environmental 
leaders, broad portfolio-wide policies on key sustainability issues such as climate change, 
biodiversity conservation and pollution management, and public policy advocacy to promote 
better social and environmental regulation at national and global levels. While the NGPF-G 
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and NZSF undertake some of these measures, they are not done comprehensively; for example, 
less than 1% of the NGPF-G’s portfolio is earmarked for positive environmental investment, 
and both only engage with a miniscule fraction of companies in their vast portfolios. 
Fundamentally, both funds are biased to seeing how sustainability contributes to investment 
value, rather than how investment value may contribute to sustainability. 
Conceivably, if each SWF made sustainability a priority, they would be justified in divesting 
from a vast number of entities. Yet, because very few companies in the world presently meet 
rigorous sustainability standards,157 such an approach would be unworkable for the SWFs. 
Therefore, rather than divesting, they would need to rely mainly on a mix of corporate 
engagement and positive investment in environmental programs. Such strategies allow 
maintenance of a broadly diversified portfolio without compromising financial returns. But 
they would only be influential if undertaken on a much larger scale, and by SWFs acting in 
concert and with other investment institutions to achieve a critical mass of influence. 
Legislative change is likely needed to spur such a change, coupled with additional resources to 
allow screening, risk assessment, engagement and positive investment on a much greater scale. 
Legislation could minimise fund managers’ discretion to deviate from sustainability goals and 
to promote a cultural shift in their decision-making. Such reform has already been proposed in 
NZ, but without success. In 2006 and 2010 the NZ Parliament debated a Private Member’s Bill, 
which sought to strengthen the ethical investment framework of the NZSF and apply similar 
standards to other NZ Crown financial institutions.158 The Bill included a duty on the NZSF 
Guardians “to promote socially responsible and environmentally sustainable development,”159 
and that investment policies must take into account international norms and conventions 
supported or ratified by the New Zealand government.160 Such an ambitious duty would have 
needed supplementary rules to provide meaningful direction regarding sustainability indicators 
and investment time-frames, as well as more administrative resources to enable effective 
implementation. NZ already has similar duties in its environmental and planning legislation, 
and a substantial body of judicial case law and administrative practice, which could help guide 
elaboration of a sustainability goal for investment purposes.161 
Reforming the governance of the NGPF-G and NZSF alone is unlikely to be sufficient to make 
either a role model for marathon investing. Halvorssen argues that “sustainable development 
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needs to be incorporated into the SWFs’ General Accepted Principles and Practices (Santiago 
Principles or GAPP).”162 She recommends that the Principles should explicitly require SWFs to 
take into account climate change as a key environmental issue. Such a reform would render the 
Santiago Principles ahead of some of the existing SRI international codes such as the UNPRI. 
A formal international treaty for SWFs that prioritises sustainability might be even more 
beneficial, but of course faces greater political hurdles. 
Without further legislative changes, the NGPF-G will likely remain ahead of the NZSF in 
promoting ethical investment owing to several institutional and structural differences between 
the funds. The NZSF is managed solely by the Guardians who enjoy relatively broad discretion 
in interpreting and implementing their ethical mandate. The NGPF-G is supported by a 
Council on Ethics, whose institutional separation from the Norges Bank and Ministry allows 
the Council to focus purely on ethical issues without being distracted about the financial 
implications of its recommendations. In administering the NGPF-G, the Ministry and Norges 
Bank are subject to ethical guidelines that are much more extensive and detailed than those of 
the NZSF’s. The NZSF perhaps faces greater pressure to meet financial returns,163 as it must 
provide for the future funding of NZ pension payments, which are forecast to grow 
substantially; by contrast, the Norwegian fund invests abundant surplus oil wealth without any 
overt or indirect financial liabilities.164 The NGPF-G is also considerably larger than the NZSF, 
giving it greater leeway to “indulge” in ethical issues alongside financial returns. Finally, the 
NGPF-G only invests outside its national borders, while the NZSF invests both abroad and 
domestically. Because it would problematic for the NZSF to exclude NZ companies’ on the 
basis of their social and environmental practices, which are already subject to NZ regulation, it 
faces greater constraints to making its own judgements regarding ethical behaviour.  
Both the NGPF-G and NZSF have much to gain by engaging with one another and 
collaborating with other socially conscious SWFs and institutional investors. In recent years, 
there have been periodic meetings and consultations among SWFs and other major 
institutional investors such as CalPERS165 and Dutch pension funds to promote SRI. As one of 
the world’s preeminent SWFs, and with the resources on the ground to check how companies 
behave, the NGPF-G is best placed to exert leadership on SRI. Companies excluded or engaged 
	  
162 Halvorssen, supra note 80. 
163 The NZSF is expected to exceed the risk-free rate of return (the interest rate on NZ Treasury bills) by at least 
2.5% per year over rolling 20 year periods: NZSF, “Our Expected Rate of Return,” 
http://www.nzsuperfund.co.nz/index.asp?PageID=2145855927. The NGPF-G is expected over the long term to 
achieve an annual real return of 2.7% on its bond investment, 3.5% on real estate and 5.0% of equities: 
Norwegian Ministry of Finance, supra note 38, at s. 8. 
164 That oil wealth, of course, is not ever-lasting and the industry is subject to market fluctuations and potential 
constraints in a future low carbon economy. 
165 The California Public Employees' Retirement System (CalPERS) is the largest pension fund in the United 
States: http://www.calpers.ca.gov. 
	  	   	   27	  
Nordic Journal of Commercial Law 
issue 2011#2 
by the NGPF-G are more likely to subsequently be treated similarly by other funds interested in 
SRI.  
The urgency of the need for change is growing. Basic assumptions of our development path and 
the impact of financial markets must be reconsidered for the sake of the planet and thus 
humanity’s own long-term prosperity. In 2005, the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment Board 
warned “human activity is putting such strain on the natural functions of the Earth that the 
ability of the planet’s ecosystems to sustain future generations can no longer be taken for 
granted.”166 Ethical investment, if practiced widely by SWFs, could help alleviate such problems. 
	  
166 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment Board (MEAB), Living Beyond Our Means: Natural Assets and Human 
Well-Being. Statement from the Board (MEAB, 2005), 5. 
